Most buyers hear "chiropractic" and walk. They picture a single-doc storefront, owner on the adjustment table 50 hours a week, revenue that disappears the day he retires.

That mental model just cost them a look at a 10-location medical platform in Northeast Florida doing $9.7M in revenue at a 37% SDE margin, with 62 full-time employees, an in-house MRI, and two owners whose only remaining job functions are business development and light operations oversight.

This is not a chiropractic practice. This is an injury care system. And the difference is worth about $3.5M a year.

Business Type: Multi-location injury care and physical medicine group

Location: Northeast Florida (10 facilities)

Asking Price: $25,100,000 (business) + $2,700,000 (real estate), sold together

Revenue: $8,616,738 (2024) / $9,704,312 (2025)

Earnings Type: SDE

SDE: $3,549,520 (2025)

SDE Margin: 37% [$3,549,520 ÷ $9,704,312 = 36.6% ✓]

Included: $1,900,000 FF&E, $200,000 inventory, ~$3,100,000 average accounts receivable, 2 owned properties, 8 assignable leases

Reason for Sale: Retirement after 16 years

Source: Listed exclusively through Acquire Weekly

Founded in 2010, the company built its entire model around a gap in the healthcare system: soft tissue injuries. Whiplash. Torn ligaments. Nerve damage. The injuries emergency rooms triage and release, and the injuries at the center of nearly every auto accident claim in Florida.

The group runs a full clinical stack under one roof: chiropractic physicians, a medical doctor, a nurse practitioner, X-ray and diagnostics, EEG, TBI evaluation, shockwave therapy, PRP, and a dedicated high-field MRI location. A patient walks in after an accident and never has to be referred out.

Then comes the part most buyers miss. The company does not just treat the injury. It documents it. Every patient receives an Injury Evaluation Report: diagnostic results, treatment history, long-term prognosis, projected future medical costs. That report is the backbone of the patient's insurance claim or personal injury case.

That is the moat. Attorneys and adjusters need credible, structured medical documentation. This group has spent 16 years becoming the place that produces it, across 10 locations covering an entire metro region.

Revenue trajectory:

2024: $8,616,738

2025: $9,704,312

Growth: 12.6% [$9,704,312 - $8,616,738 = $1,087,574 ÷ $8,616,738 = 12.6% ✓]

2025 revenue mix:

Attorney settlements: $4,316,825

Fee for services: $4,997,493

Fees paid by card: $422,831

Patient refunds: ($32,837)

Total: $9,704,312 ✓

SDE reconstruction:

Net profit: $3,345,270

Owner salary add-back: +$154,148

Discretionary add-backs (meals, travel, owner insurance, contributions, education, penalties, moving): +$50,102

SDE: $3,549,520 [$3,345,270 + $154,148 + $50,102 = $3,549,520 ✓]

Note what is not in that add-back list: no aggressive normalization, no "projected" synergies, no phantom rent games. The add-backs total 1.4% of SDE. This is about as clean a $3.5M SDE figure as you will see at this size.

The valuation logic:

Business value at 5.0x SDE: $17,747,600 [$3,549,520 × 5.0 = $17,747,600 ✓]

Real estate (2 owned facilities): $2,750,000

Equipment and FF&E: $1,900,000

Average accounts receivable: $3,100,000

Total: $25,497,600 ✓

The asking price of $25.1M for the business is not a 7x multiple on a lifestyle practice. It is a 5x operating business plus hard assets and a working capital position that most sellers strip out at closing. The AR alone is worth more than many businesses we feature in this newsletter.

"It's owner-dependent." It isn't. Nine staff physicians generate the clinical revenue. One owner handles new patient channels and referral relationships; the other oversees day-to-day operations, a role the CIM itself notes a capable manager could replace. The 62-person team includes HR, a bookkeeper, and full front and back office infrastructure across all locations.

"Personal injury revenue is risky." It is concentrated, and we will get to that. But look at the split: attorney settlements are 44% of collections. Fee-for-service is 51%. This is not a pure PI mill. Half the revenue behaves like a conventional multi-site medical practice.

"It's too big for SBA." Correct, and that is exactly the opportunity. The SBA buyer pool caps out around $5M. Above that line, competition thins dramatically. This deal sits in the pocket where individual searchers cannot reach and large PE platforms are not looking. For a family office, an MSO platform, or a physician-led group with capital, that is the definition of an inefficient market.

"Healthcare integration is hard." The infrastructure is already built. QuickBooks-based financial operations, established billing and collections teams, assignable leases at 8 locations, and the seller offering up to 30 days of transition training plus compensated support after, with a non-compete on the table.

We flag risks in every deal we feature. Here are the real ones.

PI and regulatory exposure. Roughly 44% of collections come through attorney settlements. Florida's personal injury and PIP landscape has been a legislative football for years. A material change to accident claim economics would hit this revenue line. Any serious buyer needs a view on Florida tort dynamics before signing an LOI.

Collections realization. Billed charges in 2025 were $24.5M against $9.7M collected. That spread is normal for injury care and insurance-driven medicine, but diligence on AR aging, payer mix, and settlement timelines is mandatory. You are buying $3.1M of receivables. Verify what they are actually worth.

Ownership and licensure structure. Florida regulates who can own medical and chiropractic practices. Non-clinician buyers will likely need an MSO structure or licensed partners. This is solvable and done every day, but it belongs in your legal budget from day one.

None of these are reasons to pass. They are reasons to price diligence properly and come in with the right structure.

Add practitioners. Management states plainly that the constraint on revenue is clinical headcount, not demand. Each additional chiropractic physician at mature location volumes adds meaningful six-figure revenue at incremental margin.

Digital patient acquisition. The company is only now expanding social media. For a business whose patients search "injury doctor near me" from a tow lot, paid search and referral automation are barely-touched levers.

Regional density. Ten locations plus affiliates already blanket the metro. The playbook that built this footprint travels to adjacent Florida markets, and the documentation engine scales with it.

MRI economics. The in-house high-field MRI keeps diagnostic revenue internal. Utilization has room, and imaging referrals from outside practices are an untapped B2B channel.

Put yourself in the seat for a moment, because this is the part most deal teasers never show you.

Month 1. You close. The seller begins the 30-day transition, walking you through referral relationships, the billing engine, and the location managers. Sixty-two employees show up Monday morning and do exactly what they did Friday, because none of them work for the owner. They work for the system. Your job in month one is to not break anything and to learn where the revenue actually comes from.

Months 2 through 6. You make your first two hires: additional practitioners. The CIM says it plainly, and the P&L confirms it: this business is constrained by clinical headcount, not by patient demand. Ten locations average roughly $970,000 in revenue each [$9,704,312 ÷ 10 = $970,431 ✓]. Every new physician you slot into an existing facility uses the same front desk, the same billing team, the same rent you are already paying. The revenue is incremental. The overhead is not.

Months 6 through 12. You turn on the marketing engine the current owners never built. The company is only now expanding social media. There is no serious paid search program, no automated attorney referral pipeline, no review generation system across ten locations. For a business whose customer literally searches "injury doctor near me" from the side of the road, this is the cheapest growth in the deal. You are not inventing demand. You are catching demand that already exists and currently flows to competitors.

Year 2. With the base humming, you open location eleven in an adjacent market. Not a leap of faith, a copy-paste. The clinical model, the documentation engine, the staffing template, and the lease playbook already exist. Eight of the current ten locations run on assignable leases, so you know exactly what the real estate formula looks like. A new location ramping to the system average adds roughly $970,000 of revenue at the company's 37% margin profile: about $360,000 of SDE per site at maturity [$970,431 × 0.37 = $359,059 ✓].

Year 3. You do it again, and you add an imaging channel. The in-house high-field MRI currently serves internal patients. Opening it to outside referring practices turns a cost center into a B2B revenue line, because every orthopedic and neurology practice in the region needs scan capacity and hates hospital pricing.

None of this requires genius. It requires capital, discipline, and a willingness to run a playbook the current owners wrote and then aged out of. They are not selling because the machine stopped working. They are selling because they are done, after 16 years, and retirement does not negotiate.

Here is why this deal is not just a cash flow purchase. It is a platform entry.

Multi-site physical medicine, MSK, and injury care groups are one of the most active roll-up categories in healthcare private equity right now, and the pricing behaves in tiers. Sub-$2M EBITDA practices trade like small businesses. Platforms above roughly $5M EBITDA with professional management trade like institutions, at meaningfully higher multiples, because PE funds can finance them and bolt onto them.

You are buying at 5.0x on the operating business. The buyers above the $5M EBITDA line routinely pay 7x to 9x. The entire strategy is crossing that line and selling the same cash flows to a bigger checkbook.

Illustrative acquisition structure (business + real estate, $27.8M all-in):

Equity: $11,120,000 (40%)

Debt: $16,680,000 conventional @ 8.5% / 10-year amortization

Annual Debt Service: $2,481,698 [$206,808/mo × 12 ✓]

SDE: $3,549,520

Management replacement (both owner roles): ($300,000)

Adjusted EBITDA: $3,249,520

Cash After Debt Service, Year 1: $767,822 [$3,249,520 - $2,481,698 = $767,822 ✓]

DSCR: 1.31x [$3,249,520 ÷ $2,481,698 = 1.31 ✓]

You are cash flow positive from day one, after paying yourself nothing and paying professional managers to run both former owner seats. Every growth initiative above is funded by the business, not by new checks.

Five-year growth build:

Starting adjusted EBITDA: $3,249,520

Add 3 practitioners across existing sites: +$1,000,000

Digital acquisition and attorney referral engine: +$450,000

Two new locations at maturity: +$720,000 [2 × $359,059 ≈ $718,118 ✓]

MRI outside-referral channel: +$380,000

Year 5 EBITDA (projected): $5,800,000

Exit verification:

Year 5 EBITDA: $5,800,000

Exit Multiple (platform tier, conservative): 7.5x

Exit Value: $43,500,000 [$5,800,000 × 7.5 = $43,500,000 ✓]

Debt Remaining (Year 5): ($10,080,073)

Equity Value at Exit: $33,419,927 [$43,500,000 - $10,080,073 = $33,419,927 ✓]

Original Equity In: ($11,120,000)

Multiple on Equity: 3.0x ✓, before five years of distributions and before any real estate appreciation on the two owned properties

Assumptions are assumptions. Cut every growth number in half and you still exit above $4.5M EBITDA, still clear the platform threshold, and still roughly double your equity while collecting cash along the way. The downside case in this deal is "you own a boring, profitable medical group." Most acquisitions should be so lucky.

Everything above applies to any capitalized buyer. But if you are an MD, a DO, a DC, or a licensed practitioner with capital partners behind you, this opportunity tilts further in your favor, in four specific ways.

The structure gets simpler and cheaper. Florida regulates who can own medical and chiropractic entities. A non-clinician buyer solves this with an MSO structure: workable, common, but it adds legal cost, ongoing administrative friction, and a licensed partner who holds equity or fees. A licensed buyer skips the workaround entirely. You own the thing itself. That is faster to close, cheaper to run, and cleaner to sell.

There is a six-figure line item with your name on it. The 2025 P&L carries $343,216 for the medical doctor role within professional staff. An MD buyer who assumes medical director duties captures some or all of that spend as owner earnings from the first payroll cycle. That is not a growth projection. It is a cost already sitting in the financials, waiting for an owner qualified to internalize it.

Recruiting becomes your unfair advantage. The single constraint on this business is clinical headcount. Physicians recruit physicians far better than administrators do. A licensed owner walking into a residency program, a chiropractic college, or a conference carries credibility no MSO executive can buy. The bottleneck that limits every other buyer is the one you are naturally best equipped to break.

You become the exact asset PE wants to buy later. When the platform funds come shopping at the $5M+ EBITDA level, their favorite target profile is a physician-founded, physician-led group with clean financials and a management layer underneath the owner. You would not just be building toward their multiple. You would be building their ideal acquisition, and competitive processes for that profile are where 7.5x becomes 9x.

For a licensed buyer, this is the rarest kind of deal: a business where your credential is not just a compliance checkbox but a direct driver of margin, growth, and exit value.

Businesses with $3.5M of clean SDE, hard assets underneath the price, and a genuinely replaceable owner are scarce in any year. This one adds three accelerants.

The seller is retiring, not testing the market. Sixteen years in, both owners are at or near retirement age with no desire to continue. Retirement sellers transact.

The deal sits in the least competitive pocket of the market: too large for the SBA buyer crowd, not yet large enough for the big platform funds to originate directly. That window is where the best entry multiples live, and it closes the moment a fund decides to reach down for it.

And the category has a bid. Physical medicine and injury care roll-ups are actively acquiring in Florida right now. The strategic buyers who would pay the platform multiple in five years are the same ones who may simply take this off the table today if qualified buyers hesitate.

This is a platform acquisition. The buyer who wins it looks like one of these:

A family office or independent sponsor seeking cash-yielding healthcare assets with a management layer already in place.

An MSO or multi-site medical platform adding a dense, documented, referral-driven regional group.

A physician or chiropractic entrepreneur with capital partners, ready to step into a system 16 years in the making rather than build one.

At $3.5M of SDE, even a conservatively leveraged structure produces seven-figure annual cash flow to equity from the first year, with real estate and $3.1M in receivables underneath the enterprise value as downside protection.

This opportunity is listed by Acquire Weekly. Access to the full financial package, facility details, and a call with our team requires three things:

Qualified buyers will receive the confidential information package and next steps within one business day of verification.

Deals with this combination of scale, margin, and asset backing do not sit in the lower middle market for long. If this is your buy box, reply now.