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The $6.4M Distribution Play: How a "Messy" Wholesale Business Became a $22M Asset in 42 Months

Ask any searcher what they're looking for and you'll hear the same thing:

"High-margin software. Recurring revenue. Asset-light."

Nobody says "I want a distribution business with 8,400 SKUs, two warehouses, and logistics complexity."

Which is exactly why distribution companies with bulletproof economics are sitting at 2.8x EBITDA while everyone fights over SaaS deals at 7x.

Let me walk you through a wholesale distribution business we helped sell — one that had buyers running for the hills until the right operator saw what nobody else could.

The Business That Made Everyone's Head Hurt

Business: Industrial supplies distributor (safety equipment, tools, consumables)
Sale Price: $6.4M
Annual Revenue: $11.2M
EBITDA: $1.82M (16.3%, 23% after adjustments)
Multiple: 3.5x adjusted EBITDA (2.3x reported)
Active SKUs: 8,400 products
Customers: 1,840 businesses (construction, manufacturing, facilities)
Top Customer: 4.1% of revenue
Warehouses: 2 locations (35,000 sq ft total, both leased)
Inventory: $1.9M on hand
Team: 31 people (warehouse, sales, delivery, admin)

What Made Buyers Walk Away:

"This is operational chaos" (8,400 SKUs to manage)
"Inventory nightmare" ($1.9M tied up, what if it's obsolete?)
"Low margins" (16% EBITDA? SaaS gets 30%+)
"Delivery headaches" (own trucks, drivers, logistics)
"Too many employees" (31 people to manage)
"Commoditized products" (anyone can sell safety gloves)
"Amazon will destroy this" (e-commerce threat)

Seller had the business listed for 7 months. Got 4 offers, all insultingly low ($3.2M-4.8M).

We brought him a buyer who understood distribution economics.

That buyer just turned down a $22M acquisition offer. He's holding out for $25M+.

Let me show you what everyone else missed.

Why Low Margins Don't Mean What You Think

16.3% EBITDA margin sounds terrible compared to software.

But distribution businesses aren't comparable to software. Different game, different rules.

The Real P&L Story:

Monthly Revenue: $933,333

Cost of Goods Sold:

• Product cost from suppliers: $616,667 (66% gross margin)

Gross Profit: $316,667 (34% gross margin)

Operating Expenses:

• Warehouse labor: $78,000 (8.4%)

• Sales team: $56,000 (6%)

• Delivery (trucks, drivers, fuel): $42,000 (4.5%)

• Warehouse rent: $24,000 (2.6%)

• Admin/back office: $35,000 (3.8%)

• Software/systems: $8,500 (0.9%)

• Marketing: $4,200 (0.5%)

• Insurance: $12,000 (1.3%)

• Utilities/misc: $9,000 (1%)

EBITDA: $47,967/month = $575,600 annually (6.2%... wait, what?)

The listing said $1.82M EBITDA (16.3%). What's happening here?

Owner Add-Backs:

• Owner's salary: $22,000/month ("general manager" who worked 15 hours/week)

• Owner's son's salary: $14,000/month (officially "sales," actually in college)

• Owner's wife: $8,500/month ("HR consultant," worked from home, maybe 10 hours/month)

• Owner's luxury SUV: $2,100/month (Escalade "delivery vehicle")

• Country club + memberships: $3,800/month ("business development")

• Owner's health insurance + family: $4,200/month

• Personal legal fees: $6,900/month (personal lawsuit, coded as business expense)

• Travel (family vacations): $5,800/month

• Meals & entertainment (mostly personal): $3,200/month

• Home office rent (paid to himself): $4,500/month

• Random personal expenses: $9,200/month

Total monthly add-backs: $84,200

Actual EBITDA: $132,167/month = $1.586M annually (17%)

Still seems low? Here's the kicker:

Hidden Operational Inefficiencies:

The business was run like it was 1987. Here's what the buyer found:

1. Purchasing was reactive (ordered when inventory hit zero, missed volume discounts)

2. Delivery routes were random (drivers chose their own routes, wasting fuel)

3. No inventory management system (Excel spreadsheets, frequent stockouts)

4. Sales team had no CRM (literally paper notes and memory)

5. Pricing hadn't been updated in 4 years (still using 2019 price list)

6. No cross-selling (customer buying gloves never offered safety glasses)

Just fixing these obvious problems:

• Better purchasing (volume discounts): +2% gross margin = +$224K EBITDA

• Route optimization: -15% delivery costs = +$76K EBITDA

• Inventory software (reduce stockouts): +3.5% revenue = +$392K revenue, +$137K EBITDA

• Price increase (8%): +$896K revenue at 100% margin = +$896K EBITDA

• Cross-selling (10% basket increase): +$1.12M revenue, +$381K EBITDA

Potential EBITDA: $3.3M (29.5% margin)

At 4x multiple, that's a $13.2M business.

The buyer paid $6.4M for it.

The SKU Complexity That's Actually a Competitive Moat

8,400 active SKUs across 12 product categories.

Every buyer saw this number and panicked. "Inventory nightmare. Too complex."

Here's what they didn't understand:

Why Industrial Buyers Choose Distributors:

A construction company needs:

• Hard hats (12 different types depending on job site requirements)

• Safety glasses (8 varieties - clear, tinted, prescription-ready, anti-fog)

• Gloves (43 SKUs - cut-resistant, chemical-resistant, temperature-rated, sizes)

• First aid supplies (everything from band-aids to trauma kits)

• Fall protection (harnesses, lanyards, anchors - all job-specific)

• Hearing protection (earplugs, earmuffs, custom-molded)

• Respirators (different filters for different hazards)

• Safety vests (hi-vis, mesh, winter-rated, traffic control)

Option A: Buy from 8 different vendors

• 8 purchase orders

• 8 minimum order quantities

• 8 shipping fees

• 8 invoices to process

• 8 vendor relationships to manage

• 8 potential stockouts

Option B: Buy everything from one distributor

• 1 purchase order

• 1 delivery

• 1 invoice

• 1 vendor relationship

• 1 call when something's wrong

This is why customers pay 18-25% more than buying direct.

The complexity is the value. One-stop-shop beats lowest price.

The SKU Economics:

Of 8,400 SKUs:

• Top 200 SKUs: 68% of revenue (fast-movers, high volume)

• Next 800 SKUs: 24% of revenue (medium movers)

• Remaining 7,400 SKUs: 8% of revenue (long-tail, specialized)

Most buyers think: "Cut the 7,400 slow SKUs. Too much complexity."

Reality: Those 7,400 SKUs are WHY customers buy the top 200.

Example: Customer orders 500 pairs of work gloves (top SKU). But they also need 6 pairs of specialized chemical-resistant gloves for a specific job.

If you don't carry the specialty gloves, they buy ALL their gloves elsewhere.

The long tail protects the high-volume items.

Inventory Turns by Category:

Fast-movers: 8.2x annual turns
Medium-movers: 4.1x turns
Long-tail: 1.3x turns

Blended: 5.8x turns (industry average: 4.2x)

This business turns inventory 38% faster than competitors.

Translation: $1.9M inventory supports $11.2M revenue with less capital than competitors need.

The "Commodity Products" Myth That Misses The Business Model

"Anyone can sell safety gloves. This is commoditized."

Let me show you why that's completely wrong:

What This Business Actually Sells:

1. Availability ("I need 200 hard hats by tomorrow morning" - they have it)

2. Selection ("I need cut-level 5 gloves in size XXL" - they stock obscure sizes)

3. Delivery (customer doesn't pick up, it's delivered to job site same day)

4. Credit Terms (net 30 payment vs buying on Amazon requires credit card)

5. Expertise ("What respirator for spray painting in confined spaces?" - they know)

6. Account Management (dedicated rep who knows their business)

7. Emergency Service (after-hours delivery for urgent needs)

Customer Survey Results (buyer did this during diligence):

"Why do you buy from us vs. competitors?"

• Same-day delivery: 34%

• Product availability: 28%

• Account rep relationship: 18%

• Credit terms: 12%

• Expertise/guidance: 8%

Price ranked 6th.

Only 3% of customers cited "best price" as the main reason.

The Amazon Question:

"Why can't customers just buy from Amazon Business?"

They can. Some do for non-urgent items.

But Amazon doesn't:

• Deliver within 4 hours for emergencies

• Provide on-site safety consultations

• Extend net-60 terms to established customers

• Stock 43 different glove SKUs in every size

• Have a rep who understands their specific needs

Amazon is great for commodity products shipped to an office.

This business serves job sites where downtime costs $15K+ per hour.

Nobody's waiting 2 days for Amazon when workers can't enter a confined space without the right respirator.

The Customer Base Everyone Undervalued

1,840 active customers. Average customer: $6,087 annually.

Here's the breakdown everyone missed:

Customer Segmentation:

Whales (28 customers, 1.5%): $150K+ annually each

• Total revenue: $5.1M (45.5% of total)

• Average: $182K per customer

• Churn: 0% in past 5 years

Big Fish (84 customers, 4.6%): $50K-150K annually

• Total revenue: $3.2M (28.6%)

• Average: $68K per customer

• Churn: 2.8% annually

Regular Accounts (427 customers, 23.2%): $10K-50K annually

• Total revenue: $2.1M (18.8%)

• Average: $24K per customer

• Churn: 8.4% annually

Small Accounts (1,301 customers, 70.7%): Under $10K annually

• Total revenue: $0.8M (7.1%)

• Average: $615 per customer

• Churn: 24% annually

What Everyone Saw: "High customer churn, unstable revenue."

What The Buyer Saw:

Top 112 customers (6.1% of base) generate 74% of revenue with 1.8% churn.

The other 1,728 customers (93.9%) generate 26% of revenue with high churn - but who cares? They're not the business.

The Real Business Model:

Serve 100-120 core industrial accounts that buy $50K-200K annually.

Everything else is nice-to-have bonus revenue.

Customer Lifetime Analysis:

Whales (28 customers):

• Average tenure: 11.4 years

• Projected lifetime: 25+ years (zero have ever left)

• Customer LTV: $4.55M each

Total LTV of whale customers: $127M

You're buying access to $127M in future cash flows for $6.4M.

The Warehouse Operations That Scale Like Software

Two warehouses. 31 employees. Trucks. Logistics.

Everyone saw complexity and labor intensity.

Here's what the buyer understood:

Current Operational Metrics:

Orders processed: 2,840/month
Orders per warehouse employee: 142/month
Revenue per warehouse employee: $46,700/month
Lines picked per employee per hour: 28

Industry Benchmarks:

Orders per employee: 180/month (average)
Revenue per employee: $55K/month
Lines picked per hour: 35

This warehouse is 21-25% less efficient than it should be.

Why?

• No warehouse management system (WMS)

• Random bin locations (pickers waste time searching)

• No pick path optimization (pickers crisscross warehouse)

• Manual order entry (prone to errors, slow)

• No automation (everything is manual)

The Efficiency Opportunity:

Implement basic WMS: $45K
Reorganize warehouse (ABC slotting - fast movers near shipping): $0
Train on pick path optimization: $8K

Expected improvement: 30% productivity increase

Result:

• Same 20 warehouse employees process 3,692 orders/month (vs 2,840)

• Can support $14.5M revenue (vs $11.2M)

• No additional labor cost

You just added $3.3M revenue capacity for $53K investment.

The Scale Economics:

Revenue: $11.2M → $17M (52% growth)
Warehouse employees: 20 → 24 (20% growth)
Admin: 6 → 7 (17% growth)
Sales: 5 → 7 (40% growth)

Total employees: 31 → 38 (23% growth to support 52% revenue growth)

That's operating leverage.

Fixed costs (warehouse, systems, admin) stay relatively flat while revenue scales.

The Geographic Monopoly Hiding in Plain Sight

Both warehouses serve a 75-mile radius.

Market Coverage:

Total addressable market in radius:

• Construction companies: 2,400

• Manufacturing facilities: 840

• Property management companies: 650

• Other industrial: 1,100

• Total: 4,990 potential customers

Current customers: 1,840

Market penetration: 36.9%

But here's the interesting part:

Competitor Analysis:

Major competitors in territory:

• Grainger: 2 locations (big catalog, high prices, poor local service)

• Fastenal: 4 locations (fasteners/tools focus, limited safety)

• Regional Distributor A: 1 location (smaller, limited inventory)

• Regional Distributor B: 1 location (struggling, old ownership)

None of them do what this business does:

• Grainger: No same-day delivery, corporate pricing structure

• Fastenal: Strong in fasteners, weak in safety equipment

• Regional A: Limited SKU depth, no credit terms

• Regional B: Dying business, losing customers

This business has no true direct competitor.

Nobody else offers:

• 8,400+ SKUs in stock locally

• Same-day delivery within 75 miles

• Net-30 to net-60 terms

• Dedicated account reps

• Emergency after-hours service

The Geographic Moat:

To compete, someone would need to:

1. Build or lease 35,000 sq ft warehouse space ($24K/month)

2. Stock $1.9M in inventory (upfront capital)

3. Hire and train 31 employees

4. Build relationships with 1,840 customers

5. Offer same credit terms (needs strong balance sheet)

6. Match delivery speed (needs fleet and drivers)

Barrier to entry: $3M+ and 3-5 years

Or they could just buy this business for $6.4M and own it immediately.

The Pricing Power Nobody Was Using

The owner hadn't raised prices in 4 years.

His reasoning: "Customers are price-sensitive. Can't afford to lose anyone."

The buyer tested this immediately:

Month 2 After Acquisition:

Raised prices 8% across all customers.

Results:

• Customers lost: 3 (all small accounts, total $11K annual revenue)

• Customers who complained: 12 (buyer's team explained cost increases, all accepted)

• Customers who didn't notice: 1,825

Revenue impact:

• Lost: $11K

• Gained from price increase: $896K

• Net: +$885K (100% margin to EBITDA)

Why Did This Work?

For a construction company spending $85K annually:

• 8% increase = $6,800 more per year

• That's $567/month

• That's $28 per workday

To save $28/day, they would need to:

• Find alternative supplier (20+ hours research)

• Set up new account (credit application, references)

• Re-train purchasing team (new portal, new processes)

• Risk stockouts during transition (could cost $15K+ per incident)

• Lose dedicated account rep relationship

Nobody switches suppliers to save $28 per day.

Year 2: Raised Prices Another 6%

Lost 2 customers. Added $638K to revenue.

Year 3: Raised Prices Another 5%

Lost 1 customer. Added $565K to revenue.

Total pricing impact over 3 years: +$2.09M in EBITDA

At 4x EBITDA, that's $8.36M in added enterprise value from pricing alone.

The Delivery Fleet That's Worth Millions

4 delivery trucks. 3 full-time drivers.

Every buyer saw: "Fleet maintenance. Driver management. Logistics headaches."

Here's the reality:

Delivery Economics:

Monthly delivery costs:

• Driver salaries: $18,000 (3 drivers)

• Fuel: $6,200

• Maintenance: $2,800

• Insurance: $3,400

• Depreciation: $2,100

• Total: $32,500/month = $390K annually

Value delivered:

• Same-day delivery to 68% of orders

• Emergency delivery (within 4 hours) available

• Customers don't pay shipping (built into pricing)

Competitive Alternative:

If customers had to arrange their own pickup or shipping:

• Average shipping cost per order: $47 (industry data)

• Orders requiring delivery: 1,932/month

• Monthly shipping cost: $90,804

Customers save $58K/month in shipping costs.

The delivery fleet costs $32K/month but delivers $91K/month in value.

That's a 2.8x ROI.

Plus Strategic Value:

Competitors using third-party logistics can't offer:

• Same-day delivery (couriers take 24-48 hours)

• Emergency service (courier services don't do 4-hour rush)

• Job site delivery (couriers deliver to front desk only)

• After-hours delivery (owner's fleet has flexibility)

The fleet is a competitive moat disguised as a cost center.

The Working Capital Advantage

$1.9M inventory on hand scared every buyer.

"That's dead capital. What if products don't sell?"

Let me show you why inventory is actually an asset:

Inventory Composition:

• Fast-movers (turn 8x/year): $1.1M (58%)

• Medium-movers (turn 4x/year): $580K (31%)

• Slow-movers (turn 1.3x/year): $220K (11%)

Annual inventory turnover: 5.8x

Industry average: 4.2x

This business turns inventory 38% faster than competitors.

The Working Capital Cycle:

Payment terms from suppliers: Net 60 (pay suppliers in 60 days)
Payment terms to customers: Net 30 (customers pay in 30 days)

Cash conversion cycle: -30 days

Translation: Customers pay BEFORE the business has to pay suppliers.

How This Creates Cash:

Month 1: Buy $617K inventory, don't pay yet
Month 1: Sell inventory for $933K
Month 2: Collect $933K from customers (net 30)
Month 3: Pay suppliers $617K (net 60)

Cash in bank: $316K profit + 30-day float on supplier payment

The business is funded by suppliers.

As revenue grows, suppliers fund the growth (not the owner).

Growth Example:

Revenue grows from $11.2M to $17M (52% growth)
Inventory needs to grow from $1.9M to $2.9M (+$1M)

But with net-60 supplier terms and net-30 customer terms:

• Collect customer payments faster than supplier payments due

• Growth is self-funding

• No outside capital needed

The $1.9M inventory isn't a drag. It's a cash-generating engine.

The Technology Gap That's Pure Upside

The business was running on:

• QuickBooks Desktop (2012 version)

• Excel spreadsheets for inventory

• Handwritten delivery routes

• Paper customer files

• No CRM whatsoever

Every buyer saw: "Technical debt. Expensive to modernize."

The buyer saw: "Free margin expansion."

Technology Implementation (Year 1):

Inventory Management System: $65K

• Real-time inventory tracking

• Automated reorder points

• Demand forecasting

• ABC analysis for slotting

Impact: Reduced stockouts 73%, improved turns to 6.8x

CRM System: $24K

• Customer purchase history

• Automated follow-ups

• Cross-sell suggestions

• Quote management

Impact: Increased average order size 14% through cross-selling

Route Optimization Software: $18K

• Optimized delivery routes

• Real-time tracking

• Automated dispatch

Impact: Reduced delivery costs 22% ($86K annually)

E-commerce Portal: $85K

• Customers can order 24/7

• See real-time inventory

• Track order status

• Access invoices

Impact: 31% of orders now placed online (reduced phone order processing time)

Total Technology Investment: $192K
Annual EBITDA Improvement: $447K
Payback Period: 5.2 months

Plus the business is now sellable to tech-savvy acquirers at premium multiples.

How The Buyer Structured This

Seller wanted $6.4M. Was exhausted from tire-kickers and ready to close with serious buyer.

Buyer's Offer:

Total Purchase Price: $6.4M

• Cash at close: $1.9M (30%)

• SBA 7(a) loan: $3.2M at 7.75% (10-year, $38,200/month)

• Seller note: $1.3M at 5.5% (5-year, $24,700/month)

Cash Flow Coverage:

EBITDA (adjusted): $132,167/month
SBA payment: $38,200
Seller note: $24,700
Net operating cash flow: $69,267/month = $831K annually

Buyer's $1.9M down payment pays back in 27.6 months from cash flow.

Why This Structure Worked:

SBA loved it:

• Hard assets (inventory + equipment = strong collateral)

• Long operating history (22 years)

• Recurring customer base

• Essential business (safety equipment is non-discretionary)

Seller loved it:

• Full asking price

• 70% cash upfront ($5.1M between cash and SBA)

• Seller note gives him 5.5% return (better than bonds)

• 45-day close

Buyer loved it:

• Only $1.9M out of pocket

• Positive cash flow from day one

• Clear playbook for improvements

• Low multiple (2.3x reported, 3.5x adjusted)

The Value Creation Timeline

Here's exactly how the buyer turned $6.4M into $22M in 42 months:

Months 1-6: Stabilize + Quick Wins

• Spend time with owner during transition

• Interview top 20 customers

• Raise prices 8% (added $885K EBITDA)

• Implement inventory management system

• Reorganize warehouse for efficiency

Results: $12.1M revenue, $2.47M EBITDA (20.4%)

Months 7-18: Systems + Expansion

• Implement CRM and cross-selling program

• Launch e-commerce portal

• Add route optimization

• Raise prices another 6%

• Add 3 new sales reps (targeted growth)

• Improve warehouse productivity 30%

Results: $15.8M revenue, $3.92M EBITDA (24.8%)

Months 19-30: Geographic Expansion

• Open third warehouse location (adjacent market, 50 miles away)

• Add 4 delivery drivers

• Hire regional sales manager

• Acquire small competitor for $680K (added 240 customers)

• Raise prices another 5%

Results: $21.4M revenue, $5.78M EBITDA (27%)

Months 31-42: Scale + Exit Prep

• Optimize operations across 3 locations

• Implement shared services (centralize admin)

• Add vendor-managed inventory for top 10 customers

• Launch private label program (higher margins)

• Build executive team (GM, VP Sales, VP Ops)

Results: $26.2M revenue, $7.1M EBITDA (27.1%)

Current Valuation Offers: $21M-23M (3.0-3.2x EBITDA)

Buyer's Position:

• Paid: $6.4M

• Cash invested: $1.9M

• Distributions taken: $3.8M

• Current equity value: ~$19M (after paying down debt)

• Total wealth created: $22.8M from $1.9M invested

That's a 1,200% return in 42 months.

The playbook wasn't complex:

1. Fix obvious inefficiencies (pricing, systems, operations)

2. Add capacity where needed (warehouses, people, technology)

3. Acquire smaller competitors (roll-up strategy)

4. Professionalize management (make it sellable)

Nothing revolutionary. Just operational excellence.

What Could Derail This

Major Customer Concentration (35% Risk)

Top 28 customers = 45.5% of revenue. If you lose 3-4 whales, it hurts badly.

How to mitigate:

• Lock top 20 into 3-year contracts (volume discounts for commitment)

• Assign dedicated account reps to whales

• Quarterly business reviews with each whale

• Add services that increase switching costs (vendor-managed inventory, on-site safety training)

Supplier Disruption (25% Risk)

What if key suppliers cut you off or raise prices 40%?

How to mitigate:

• Diversify suppliers (use 2-3 sources for top SKUs)

• Build direct relationships with manufacturers (bypass distributors)

• Negotiate long-term contracts with price caps

• Develop private label alternatives

Economic Downturn (40% Risk)

Construction and manufacturing slow down, customers cut spending.

How to mitigate:

• Safety equipment is semi-essential (OSHA requirements don't change)

• Diversified across 12 industries (not all decline simultaneously)

• Focus on maintenance/repair (more stable than new construction)

• 27% EBITDA margins provide cushion to weather downturn

Talent Exodus (30% Risk)

Lose key salespeople or warehouse manager, operations suffer.

How to mitigate:

• Pay above market (you have margin)

• Profit sharing (align incentives)

• Career paths (warehouse to supervisor to manager)

• Retention bonuses for key people

Amazon/E-commerce Disruption (20% Risk)

What if customers shift to online buying?

How to mitigate:

• Amazon can't do same-day delivery to job sites

• Amazon doesn't extend net-60 credit terms

• Amazon doesn't provide on-site safety consultations

• Build e-commerce portal (meet customers where they are)

• Focus on service, not just products

Why Distribution Beats Software (For Most Buyers)

Everyone wants software businesses. I get it.

But let's compare actual returns:

Typical SaaS Acquisition:

• Purchase at 6x EBITDA

• 25% EBITDA margins

• 15-25% annual growth

• Exit at 6-7x in 3-4 years

• 1.5-2x total return

This Distribution Business:

• Purchased at 3.5x adjusted EBITDA (2.3x reported)

• 27% EBITDA margins (after improvements)

• 52% annual growth (operational improvements + acquisitions)

• Exiting at 3-3.2x in 42 months

• 12x total return (1,200%)

The distribution business crushed SaaS returns.

Why?

1. Lower entry multiple (2.3-3.5x vs 6-8x)

2. Massive operational upside (inefficiencies to fix)

3. Fragmented market (easy to acquire competitors)

4. Real assets (inventory, fleet, customer relationships)

5. Essential products (safety equipment isn't discretionary)

Distribution businesses are misunderstood and undervalued.

While everyone fights over SaaS deals, smart operators are building wealth in wholesale distribution.

We Helped Sell This Business

The seller had this listed for 7 months. Every buyer who looked at it got scared off by complexity.

Too many SKUs. Too much inventory. Too operational.

We knew it wasn't complex — it was just misunderstood.

We connected the seller with a buyer who had distribution experience and could see the opportunity everyone else missed.

That buyer is now sitting on a $22M+ asset he bought for $6.4M.

Want to find deals like this?

Most buyers will never see opportunities like this because they're looking in the wrong places.

They're competing with 50 other buyers for every SaaS listing on the marketplaces.

Meanwhile, profitable distribution businesses sit unsold because nobody understands the model.

That's where we come in.

The Continental specializes in sourcing misunderstood businesses with exceptional economics:

• Distribution companies with operational inefficiencies (pure upside)

• Wholesale businesses with pricing power nobody's using

• Essential B2B operations everyone thinks are "too complex"

• Businesses with real assets and customer moats

We find them before they're listed publicly.

Fill out our assessment form and schedule a call to see what we're sourcing.

While everyone else overpays for software, we'll show you the distribution businesses printing cash at 30-60% discounts.

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